Dialogs
Can we fix discrimination in markets?
Studies and anecdotal evidence suggest that 40 years after the civil rights era, African Americans still find themselves under scrutiny in retail stores and women pay higher prices at car dealerships. How can we insure fair treatment in markets?
Ian Ayres: One of the areas of discrimination in markets that I’ve written about is disparate treatment in retail stores. I got a call from the attorney general’s civil rights division in a major office that you guys would all know. They’re interested in having studies done on testing for discrimination in big-box stores. They were calling to find out what tests they should do, and if I would help.
They were worried about disproportionate surveillance — and investigation — of minority shoppers. But I was trying to have them broaden it to include idiosyncratic accommodation. I wanted them to go in places that don’t have a restroom and say, “Can I use the employees’ restroom?” Or go in with a kid, and say, “My kid needs to use the restroom.” Or “I’d like to take more than three items into the dressing room.” My sense is that you’re not going to find discrimination on something that other people can see the action and compare. You won’t see it on price.
Fiona Scott Morton: No, because prices are posted.
Ayres: Exactly. So what should be tested?
Rick Brooks: I’ve run surveys where I asked people the question, “How often have you been racially profiled while driving?” And more relevant for what you’re talking about, Ian, “How often have you been racially profiled or followed while you’re in a store?” When looking at the correlation between their answers to these questions and their skin color I observed an interesting result. I had two measures of their skin color: One self-determined, where I ask them to report their skin color on a Likert scale from 1 to 5. And a second report from a research assistant coding their skin color on the same scale.
When I used the RA’s assessment of the subject’s skin color to predict how likely people are to report being racially profiled while shopping — controlling for gender and occupation and a few other things — the RA’s assessment didn’t predict much. But when I used the subject’s self-assessment, it was one of the strongest predictors in the equation.
Scott Morton: So you’re mapping a cultural thing, not a visual color. Like hairstyle, plus color, plus the way they’re dressed, plus their cultural orientation?
Brooks: Right. There’s something there, but I’m not sure what the causation is. I don’t know, for example, if your perception of your stereotypicality affects your behavior and drives your interactions. But this is very intriguing.
Scott Morton: I feel sorry for the people working in the shops, in the following sense. Of course, I don’t think they should be using race to discriminate against people. But on the other hand, they’re being given incentives to, say, reduce shoplifting: they get a bonus, for example. And they’re being given incentives to provide good-quality service. So when somebody wants to take four items instead of three into the dressing room, they have to make a decision about whether this is the kind of person who, if they’ll let them take four in, there will be a positive return or a negative return. Were I in their circumstances, it’s not the skin color you care about — it’s the respect they treat you with, and the quality of the clothes they’re wearing, and whether they speak in complete sentences that is what you want to use to decide if they will steal the items or not.
James Baron: But this is still a statistical discrimination problem, right? The clerk is still making a prediction about individual behavior based on group characteristics. He’s just looking at complete sentences versus no complete sentences rather than white versus black.
Scott Morton: Isn’t the point that we’re supposed to train these guys to not use factors we’re worried about, namely skin color, and to use things that they should legitimately use, like whether the person looks like they’re going to steal something? Is the store supposed to not take that into account at all, and just say, “I’m sorry, there’s a rule that you can only take three items into the dressing room, and even though you look terribly trustworthy and you have two toddlers, so you obviously don’t want to be running back and forth between the shelves and the dressing room, we’re going to drive you away to a different store, because we refuse to be helpful?”
Brooks: Part of it is about efficiency, and part of it is about distribution. The costs are going to be spread. Let’s say we’re going to force the store to adopt an inefficient monitoring technology, where they keep an eye on everyone. It’s going to raise prices, and the cost’s going to be shared, broadly, by consumers. Alternatively, we can let them work with a more efficient system that will lower costs, but those costs are going to be concentrated on the actual offenders and the innocent people who are also part of that same subcategory.
Scott Morton: In terms of what group you fall into, skin is something you can’t choose. Speaking in complete sentences, sounding polite, and not having tattoos are choices you make. And you as a consumer can decide to make those choices. You know how you’re going to be treated in the labor market or in the market for shoppers. And maybe that’s something you have to deal with.
Baron: Doesn’t this version of discrimination fall into the category of things that the market ought to eliminate? It would seem that between two stores, the one whose gatekeepers are wrongly precluding good customers from going into the dressing room with four items is going to be penalized in the market. It would seem like that behavior ought to be driven out by the market, unless there’s something else going on that’s sort of counteracting that. If those beliefs are not accurate...
Brooks: Take Denny’s. That’s a chain that, in some markets, has engaged in proven discriminatory practices. So I don’t think that we can trust the market to drive out discrimination, in part because there may not be another option for the customer — the very population that’s subject to discrimination doesn’t have the advantage of competitive forces. It’s a compound. There’s a market failure and, potentially, discrimination that may not be corrected by competition.
Baron: Either from an economic point of view or a legal point of view, what is the most effective remedy? If there are two stores, and one of them has a gatekeeper who is statistically discriminating in ways that are actually costing the firm business, but we can’t rely on the consumer to go elsewhere...
Ayres: I think the right remedy turns on the underlying cause of the discrimination. So in Fiona’s work on car buying, if the race discrimination is caused, in part, by price discrimination, that is, trying to get as much money as possible out of any customer, competition is good — it will help drive out the racial disparities. If it is caused by rational statistical inference, where dealers have determined, accurately, that they can get more money out of certain groups because they lack information, more competition is not going to help. That will force firms to apply those determinations more assiduously so as to not get left behind by the better statistical discriminators. There, the government might want to intervene informationally, to give those groups the tools they need, and sidestep the statistical piece.
If the discrimination is preferential — that is, a bias for one race over another — then competition may be good or bad. If it’s preferences of the median consumer that cause the problem, competition may reinforce the effect. If it’s preferences of agents — the clerk in the store, for example — then competition might drive it out.
Brooks: When I think about the remedy, the question is the objective. What are we going after? Is it maximizing return? Are we focused more on the economics, or are we also interested in the distribution of rights and protections, even at some economic cost? I think we could probably generate a lot more wealth by taking a lot of rights out of play. But there are some things that we just won’t do, or let some firms do.
Baron: It seems to me this discussion speaks to the efficacy of one of the primary remedies that firms have adopted to deal with these problems, which is diversifying the work force. And it’s not obvious to me that if there are two Marshalls, next door to each other, and one has 50% of the people who are gatekeepers to the dressing rooms be African American, and the other has 5%, holding constant the ethnic mix of the clientele, that we would observe much difference. It seems to me that the premise that a lot of diversity initiatives have is that somehow if I go in and I see a face that looks like mine, then these processes that would otherwise work against me aren’t going to.
Scott Morton: We disagree a little bit. If the African American gatekeeper at Marshalls can then categorize African American shoppers into 50 different buckets, according to their responsibility level, and I can’t, because I’m less familiar with that demographic group, then that person knows the top 25 of her demographic buckets are the right ones to allow into the dressing room with four items, and the bottom 25 aren’t. I wouldn’t make as good decisions because my background limits my knowledge of that group.
Baron: Let me suggest that a firm that thinks it’s going to address this problem by hiring a quota of African Americans probably has structured the job in a way so that, even if that discretion existed, it isn’t going to be utilized.
Scott Morton: I used to think that affirmative action was a little silly in this way. But I’ve changed my mind somewhat by watching academics, in particular. I think the gain you get by hiring an academic from a previously underutilized group is their knowledge of topics that everybody else doesn’t know anything about. So you get more studies of marriage markets among Muslims, for example; you get Roland Fryer studying “acting white,” which, frankly, I knew nothing about until I read his paper.
Baron: That argument gets made all the time: we need a diverse set of perspectives. But is that really true at Marshalls? I’ll buy the academics....
Brooks: It sounds like there are a few ways that diversity might contribute value here. One is that if you hire more diverse workers, your workforce may be more effective. Their specialized knowledge, let’s say, will improve your bottom line. The second is that diversity creates some value for a targeted population. That is, you might have a more diverse customer base to which you can now better respond. And the third is that diversity will actually change perceptions in the broader society.
Ayres: How important do you think the internet’s going to be in disabling racial disparity?
Scott Morton: I think in ordinary markets, like cars, it’s hugely important. You go online, you get quotes, you become armed. So anybody who can do that can beat the statistical discrimination, or any other kind, that’s out there.
Baron: Is that true, though? One could have said, a kind of test that Ian should have talked to the attorney general about is the capacity to come in with a kind of print-out from Vehix.com and leverage that into an actual purchase. So do you think it necessarily follows that that information at the point of purchase leads to the ability of different consumers to get the same treatment?
Scott Morton: Yes, I do. But the question is whether or not consumers who need the information the most will use it. The evidence that we have is no, they do not. I mean, this is what the digital divide is. If you don’t have educa-tion, you are less likely to have or to use an internet connection. You don’t know that you should go to the library. But a guy who knows just enough to know that he should go online actually ends up on a pretty level footing with everybody else because the online page spits out the same number to him as it does to you, and he prints it out and he takes it down to the dealership. And the dealership can make up a story about why they can’t match that price, but that’s a harder job than just quoting him the MSRP as they were able to do before.
Brooks: What do you all think of the role of information? The internet has two possible ways of leveraging information here. One is that it produces more information that everybody can see. This is what you and Jim were talking about. And there’s another way, though, in that it conceals information. Like closing off the identity of the buyer.
You can potentially purchase things on the internet without ever revealing that you’re a woman or a minority. Perhaps we should be talking about discrimination in markets — the extent to which we want to reduce it, or to take advantage of some of its beneficial aspects — as really an information management problem?
Scott Morton: The situation that Florian Zettelmeyer and I studied, in our research on cars, has the interesting feature that, when you go online for this price quote, you give them your name and address and you talk to a dealer on the phone. So the dealer pretty well knows what your race is, whether you can speak English, what your gender is. And yet we found that those people were getting the same prices as the white men when they came through the internet.
So it seemed to us that what the dealers were doing is they’re ready to take money from anybody who looks like they’re uninformed. But if you come through the internet, I think they figure out, correctly, that you know how to use the internet, and it takes you about five seconds to find another dealer who will offer a better price. And it’s not worth their time messing with you, because it’s too easy for you to walk.
Baron: Why don’t we see more consumer unions with the mandate of ensuring the purchasing rights of people who might meet discrimination?
Scott Morton: I think Costco’s done a good job in this regard. You can get insurance there. You can get eyeglasses. You can get caskets and funerals. Those are all markets in which there’s a lot of price dispersion and a lot of stores that have high markups, and where you’re not purchasing frequently enough to be that well informed.
Ayres: To me, the crucial question is the extent to which the internet is going to reduce price dispersion. And it’s not a completely done deal. The first decade has been very good for us. But unlike McDonalds, where you can see if you and I got the same price for a hamburger, Amazon could try charging different prices for the same book.
But the big place where I think disparities are going to go away actually relates to some of your work, Rick, on lending. I think LendingTree can be extended to home mortgages more generally, to credit cards, to payday loans. The digital divide is going to go down, and there’s no reason you couldn’t jump on the internet and put a payday loan up to a thousand lenders. Even if this reinforces statistical discrimination, the competition is going to simultaneously be driving down the margins. It’s got to be reducing disparity.
Baron: I think you’re right that the internet has the capability of doing this. But I’ve been really struck by the variation across sectors in the speed with which that opportunity has actually been realized.
I bought a used car on the internet a couple of years ago. And it was a very specific kind of car. The manufacturer lists all of the secondary market cars that it knows of. So you can log on and find out this particular year, this color... I was still living in California, and I found a version of this car in Oakland, 40 minutes away from where I was. And I found exactly the same car — and there were only 800 of these particular cars ever made — I found the same car at a place in Philadelphia, with considerably less mileage on it, but everything else the same, for $10,000 less. When I called the guy in Oakland, he said, “You can’t compare a car that you buy here against a car that you buy in Philadelphia."
I said, “I called a car company and they said it’s $900 to ship it. I believe $10,000 minus $900 is $9,100. Is there something about the comparison that I’m missing?” You know, it is a bit of a hassle to buy a car in Philadelphia and ship it to California, but it’s not $9,100 worth of a hassle.
The question is, is there some entity that could speed up the extent to which those kinds of transactions can be made by more people?
Ayres: So what happened?
Baron: I bought the car from the guy in Philadelphia.
Scott Morton: So what’s your complaint?
Baron: My complaint is that to the guy in Oakland, it was inconceivable that somebody would do that. So I’m saying, is there some entity that would make it plausible to both sides of that transaction that that can, in fact, happen? That would seem to me it could democratize it more.
Brooks: I don’t think what you want is an entity so much as access. That’s what all of this is about. When the seller knows that you can just go to another website very quickly, and access another seller, then you can get competition. When you have access to the labor unions. When you have a credit score that gets you access. The problem, generally, I think, is a failure of access.
Scott Morton: Right, because then markets are working full steam ahead, if you have access.
Brooks: Right. So maybe the discussion isn’t so much about market failures per se, as about certain people being closed off from otherwise well-functioning
markets. Costco is great; there is just the inability of some to drive to Costco. The inability to get to the internet. Or to get a credit score rating. An inability to get to the credit union or the consumer union. Discrimination remains, not because markets are problematic, but because there are some populations that can’t get to them.
Scott Morton: If you can’t get to the good market, you’re stuck with the payday loan shop that’s next door to your house, because you don’t have the credit scores.
Other problems are more difficult than just having access to a market or to a price from Consumer Reports. A lot of what we’re doing in the world these days, like buying houses and getting credit cards, requires financial literacy, which many consumers do not have.
In the New York Times this morning, it said that to prevent bad sub-prime mortgages, Illinois wanted to make the borrowers go to two hours of counseling. This is supposed to provide financial literacy because nobody understands the pieces of paper they give you, the disclosures where you’re supposed to sign, “Yes, I understand that my interest rate is going to do this...”
Baron: In the auto example, I can log on to Edmonds and it will tell me that people in my area are paying $47 for an AM/FM stereo option on a Subaru. Do we have any evidence that using these kinds of tools changes outcomes in the market — that if more African Americans had access to those kinds of tools, we would see different outcomes?
Scott Morton: The papers I’ve written suggest that, yes, using the internet lowers the price that you pay.
Brooks: Why isn’t there a brokerage market more like that for minorities? “I will be your agent and figure out all the sources...”
Scott Morton: There are. You can go to a car broker, and the car broker will tell you “I’ll get you a car for $500 over invoice.”
Brooks: But does the population that needs it most even know about it?
Scott Morton: That’s the problem. That the people you want to help don’t know that they need help.
Baron: That brings me back to the consumers union question. Why doesn’t, say, the NAACP have a huge part of its identity be the creation of a part of its website that says, here’s where you go to figure out what’s the market price for a casket with green velvet
and six feet long in your market?
Brooks: Why would it have to be a nonprofit? Why not some savvy MBA from SOM who cares about minority markets or the minority community?
Scott Morton: You know, it might be the fear is that it is taking business away from the minority-owned businesses. So it may be that those guys are paying high prices at the local Chevrolet dealer and the local Chevrolet dealer is African American. Or the local funeral home owner is African American. And steering business to the ethnic Chinese funeral home across town is perceived as harming the community.
Ayres: I think there’s also a market failure in unwillingness to embrace for-profit services to help out minorities. There’s only one term for somebody who rents a house to a poor person, and that’s “slumlord.” If you do it on a nonprofit basis, you’re fine, but anybody who, on a for-profit basis, rents a house to a poor person, that’s what they call them.
And there’s an analogy to that for anybody who provides a TV set to a poor person. That’s actually a famous law case. It’s where the court says, “How dare you sell a TV set on credit to somebody you knew was on welfare?” As if this is something that’s a bad thing to do, to help poor people get chattel in their house.
I think Baron et al are looking in the wrong place for remedies to the breakdowns in markets when people discriminate. It's like they're running around trying to fix a bunch of leaks in a dam. You can fix all the leaks at once if you focus on the real problem, the place where discrimination happens: people's heads. We need better people not better markets.
Posted by SamS on October 25, 2007
During this conversation, the participants also discussed some of the issues of identity that underlie questions about discrimination in markets.
Rick Brooks: We’re talking about markets and discrimination, but maybe we should try to broaden it and focus on identity, developments of identity in markets and within and between firms. Economists have really not paid that much attention to identity. I don’t even believe the organizational sociologists have paid that much attention, though more than economists, to identity, as distinct from culture. Lawyers and the legal academy, strangely, have paid almost no attention to identity in business transactions. So let me put out one case that I think is relevant, that sheds some light on how broad the notion could go.
In 2003, Sun Microsystems used a contractor called Thinket Information Resources. It was a small IT company that provided a number of services to Sun along with other comparable suppliers. Thinket is a small business, wholly owned by African Americans, and the Small Business Administration had deemed it a minority-owned business. At some point the relationship between Thinket and Sun soured, and Sun started directing contracts to other suppliers. Thinket alleged that this was due to the racial identity of its owners but was unable to get legal standing to make a claim of discrimination. In a really surprising move that went against centuries of common-law practice, the federal court ruled that the corporation, the business itself, actually had a racial identity and said that ruling was necessary in order to allow it to be the target of a discriminatory act; without a racial identity, it couldn’t be discriminated against.
Later on, the same court ruled that Arco Corporation had discriminated against a company that was owned by two Sikh Indian brothers. This company wasn’t even federally recognized as minority-owned, but the court ruled that the very acts of Arco created a racial identity in this company and therefore allowed it to be discriminated against. Now these instances, I think, were a little provocative, the court overstepping…
Fiona Scott Morton: It seems bizarre.
Jim Baron: This is the Ninth Circuit, I take it?
Brooks: The Ninth Circuit. But it says something, I think, about the role of identity in markets, and identification, more broadly.
Scott Morton: I would broaden it even more. The first thing people think of when you say “discrimination,” because of our historical problems in America, is race discrimination, But when you said, “Let’s think about identity more generally,” I thought of something like, I need to buy some bonds in a financial market, and I belong to a hedge fund. And that gives me a different identity than a pension fund, which is yet a different identity from some random trader. And the person who sells to me is going to pick different prices, potentially, or different levels of service, because they perceive that I have different needs or they think that my willingness to pay is different because of the circumstances they think I’m in. And so the whole transaction might look different because of my identity.
Brooks: I think that we’re really talking about social identities, of which race and gender are probably the most commonly bandied around. But you can imagine a corporation or company or individuals having social identities that are much broader. In fact, you might think about a shareholder-primacy identity like those often connected with corporations, as sort of signaling — and this is my own spin about identity, and social identities in particular — signaling a commitment to certain social groups or certain social practices.
Ayres: You know, a lot of people would assume that markets should drive out identity-contingent behavior but you could imagine that — as Fiona suggested — people have identity-contingent preferences, and that it’s going to show up in market behavior — either likes or dislikes. Or even without any identity-contingent preferences, if they are just trying to make inferences about, as you said, reservation price, how much somebody will pay. Or in auction theory, if it’s a common value auction, you want to know how much the other person will pay, so that you know how much you’re willing to pay yourself. And that can be contingent on any identity factor that you could make an inference from.
Baron: In the psychology and sociology literature, there’s been increasing recognition that identities play the same kind of cognitive shorthand role that has been invoked for discrimination. That people use categorical distinctions of all sorts as a way of mentally economizing. And in fact we had a conference here this summer that was exactly on this issue, so I think it is something that social scientists are starting to think more about.
Rather than thinking of these things as willful and rather than thinking of them as being driven out when interests get acute, you can think of them as being a set of routines that we’ve adopted that have been useful in organizing and processing information, and in fact as the stakes get larger, we may in fact be more inclined to go with those basic beliefs we have about what differentiates one category from another.
Scott Morton: In the broader context we were talking about, there’s got to be a lot of efficiency reasons. The guy who’s selling bonds doesn’t like you better because you’re a hedge fund manager, right? But if you’re a hedge fund manager, he thinks there’s a package of prices and services and needs that you have, and that’s just a faster way to categorize you. It’s not that his utility is particularly affected by your identity, I think.
Brooks: This is a really good distinction for us to work through: the subconscious or just purely categorizing behavior, as opposed to the wholly conscious discriminatory practice, which I think is what most people have in mind when they talk about discrimination in markets.
I’ll never forget, when I took mechanism design, we had this very long discussion about a seller trying to discriminate between Romulans and Vulcans, who look exactly alike, but for some reason had different technical requirements and willingness to pay. It really placed in mind this idea of trying to separate people in ways that really aren’t cognitive.
Baron: Where I see this as coming back to markets is that to attach prices to things, we have to identify them as discrete things. So in the process by which we categorize items, the first thing we have to do is figure out what the buckets are, before we attach prices to them. And then this identity process comes in as follows — this is an example I use in my teaching, because I think it’s pretty interesting.
For a long time, the U.S. government produced something called the Dictionary of Occupational Titles, and that was supposed to be a kind of compendium of all the jobs that exist in the American labor market. It was used for all kinds of reasons — for vocational counseling, researchers use it… It evolved in the late 1950s with the work of a bunch of vocational psychologists who had kind of come up with a set of dimensions that they thought were the basis for distinguishing among jobs.
If you look at the taxonomy that they produced — and I don’t remember the numbers exactly, but I think this is close — if you look at the first dictionary that they produced, and you count up the number of distinct titles that they created for different social and behavioral sciences, there is only one for anthropology, two or three for political science, about a half dozen for sociology, about 10 for economics, and something like 38 for psychology. And if you actually look at the number of people employed in those occupations, it’s not as if there were four times as many psychologists.
So somehow, the cognitive schemes of the psychologists allowed them to see about four times as many buckets in their own group. And then, if you start thinking about how you’re going to value things in those categories, if you’re only valuing one bucket versus forty buckets, it seems likely that you’re going to have a much more dispersed, and probably have a higher mean valuation on the thing that has 40 subcategories than on the thing that has one. And I think that can actually translate quite readily into how we do things like value jobs.
Brooks: You know, Roland Fryer and Matt Jackson have a really fabulous working paper on this. They call it their categorical inference model, where they try to show that just because you have fewer interactions with minorities, by the very fact that there are fewer of them, you will be more inclined, just for reasons of cognitive efficiency, to stereotype them. And again, this is just a matter of their numerical status, as opposed to their racial status.
Something that connects to that: It turns out that African Americans are subject to the same biases against African Americans that others are, but to a lesser extent. A social psychologist here, Valerie Purdie-Vaughns, and I decided to see if we could test this a little bit, to see if we could figure out how much of it was animus versus how much of it was adverse stereotyping. So we set up an Implicit Association Test [IAT].
Does everyone know the general design of these implicit bias tests? There are four categories. Two racial and two that are something positive and something negative. You might have “good” and “white,” and then “bad” and “black.” And let’s call that pairing the stereotypical pairing. And then they’ll do the counter-stereotypical pairing, which in this case is “black” and “good” and “white” and “bad.”
So you’ll start off with the stereotypical pairing. Words or images will pop up in the middle of a screen and you’re asked to quickly assign them either to the “good/white” category on one side of the screen or the “bad/black” category on the other side. Some of them are black or white faces, and some of them are words related to good or bad like “happy” or “awful.” Then you’ll get the counter-stereotypical pairing, where you have to assign them to “good/black” or “bad/white.” The result is that when the pairing is stereotypical, you go faster then when the pairing is counter-stereotypical.
Ayres: It’s easier to sort things that you cognitively think are the same. So if you think of black as being bad and white as being good, you’re all set. It’s really much harder to sort when you mix things.
Brooks: So we set up a test where we had “black” and “professional” and “white” and “working class.” And we asked the participants to categorize jobs in which, according to the occupation census, African Americans were 8 to 10 percent of the population of workers — accountants, plumbers. What we found is that that professional blacks are less subject to the implicit bias, less likely to sort together things which stereotypically go together, than non-professional blacks.
Baron: Presumably they experience more of what’s counter-stereotypical, right? They’ve experienced more cases that don’t fit the stereotype. They themselves are a case that doesn’t fit the stereotype.
Scott Morton: And they are surrounded by people like that, presumably, in the professional association, in the neighborhood.
Baron: I guess that the question is whether whites who have had more experience with counter-stereotypical cases look less discriminatory than blacks who had fewer cases.
Brooks: White basketball fans are much more able to differentiate random black faces than white non-basketball fans.
Baron: So there’s an experience component.
Ayres: There have been over 200 IAT studies done, now, and at this moment it seems that we’re in a huge race to see if we can now validate the measure with market activity. Just now it’s on the cusp. I think there are about a dozen different studies that are trying to see if it will....
Scott Morton: …predict labor market outcomes or something?
Ayres: Labor market outcomes, and I’m working with Christine Jolls and Mahzarin Banaji, who is one of the developers of the IAT, to see if it can help predict eBay auction behavior....
Baron: There’s work showing that it predicts judgments of law enforcement, at least in hypothetical cases.
Scott Morton: So the question is whether this measure of discrimination is just hypothetical or if it correlates to real-world actions.
Ayres: Yes. And if it’s not hypothetical, whether processes of market competition and oversight eliminate the effect.
One place where we think it might particularly show up is when people have to make split-second decisions — when police see a suspect go for a shiny object, and have to decide whether it’s a gun or a key.







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